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A REFLECTION ON THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION AS SEEN FROM AN EXAMINATION OF THE
STATUS OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATIONS
By DeLois Toins Leapheart
Introduction
All too often people assume that the vindication of one's right to
due process of ]awl can only be accomplished in federal or state courts
while ignoring the fact that the constitutional requirement of due process
of law is held with equally high esteem in administrative proceedings.
Receiving due process of law in the federal courts, however, is not getting
any easier. 2 With the load on federal courts becoming increasingly heavier,
the quest for alternative avenues of settling disputes is being intensified.
Among some of the alternatives suggested are: increased use of modern
technology, expanded use of trained court administrators and more exception-
ally qualified judges. 3 This essay will suggest that in the future
administrative adjudication will play a greater role in the assurance of
due process because the reality of the over-burdened federal dockets mandates
the expanded use of the exceptionally qualified judges located in admini-
strative proceedings. As the legislature begins to lighten the workload of
the federal judiciary by requiring more deference to the decisions of
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), the role of administrative adjudication
will continue to grow.
Implementation of the larger role for administrative adjudications has
been delayed by the archaic view of various authorities who have from time
1. U.S. Constitution, Amendment V and XIV, Sec. 1. Note that this essay will
discuss due process as a general concept of fundamental fairness. For a
discussion of the elements of due process see Friendly, Some Kind of a
Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975).
2. Chief Justice Warren Burger noted in his State of the Judiciary Report that:
"in 1970, there was 317 cases for each district
judge. In 1930 we estimate that figure will be
approximately 400 cases. Filings in the Court of
Appeals have doubled in the past few years. We
can see that measured by the case filings per judge-
ship the impact of 152 new federal judges in the
omnibus bill last year will soon be wiped out.
The quality of the performances of the courts
is bound to suffer with this overload." Burger,
105 N.J.L.J. 136, col. 5(1980).
3. Burger, 105 N.J.L.J. 136 (1980).
to time asserted that the fundamental structure of the administrative
system is unconstitutional. One authority promoting such rhetoric was
the President's Committee on Administrative Management. In 1937 the
committee stated that agencies "constitute a headless 'fourth branch' of
government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated
powers. They do violence to the basic theory of the American Constitution
that there be three major branches of the government and only three.
"4
The circle of critics has become smaller and less concerned with the
abolition of administrative agencies. A more current assessment of public
feeling toward administrative agencies has been artfully summarized by
Edwin Wallace Tucker:
Nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, the
administrative agency has imbued the national
government with a faculty to act in once unknown
ways and to exert power over enterprise and indi-
vidual behavior by dimensions theretofore
unfamiliar to our legal system. A product of
legislative and executive action, sanctioned by a
once hesitant but finally receptive and now for
the most part an accommodating judiciary, admini-
strative agencies today perform a plethora of tasks
which at this juncture in time law makers have
entrusted to them because they assume that govern-
ment, by working through the administrative process,
can secure the requisite competence to cope with
the legion of complexities which mark modern day
life. 5
Although Tucker was primarily referring to administrative agencies generally,
his assessment is equally applicable to administrative adjudications in
particular. Having acquiesced to the constitutionality of administrative
adjudications, current critics merely attack the quality, cost, accuracy
and length of time required to get a hearing.
It seems beyond controversy that all administrative adjudications should
utilize procedures that conform to accepted notions of fundamental fairness
by producing prompt and accurate results. Furthermore, all administrative
adjudications should appear fair to those subjected to the process and
should complete their task with the smallest possible monetary outlay.
4. Edwin Wallace Tucker, Administrative Law Regulations of Enterprise
and Individual Liberties at 28 (1975).
5. Rep. Pres. Comm. Ad. Mgt. 39 (1937).
Although it is beyond controversy that we would like to have each of these
noble attributes as an accurate characterization of all administrative
adjudications, we know that such is not possible. One of the reasons it
is not possible is that we live in an imperfect world where increased
attention to any one of the aforementioned goals necessarily detracts from
the accomplishment of the other goals. For example, the more procedural
due process afforded to the individual who is applying for social security
disability benefits the less prompt and more backlogged administrative
dockets become. In order to effectively deal with each of the competing
considerations one must utilize an analytical framework that permits
some balancing of the competing interests. Merely setting arbitrary time
limits within which a hearing must be held or wholly relying on statistical
data to assess ALJ productivity addresses only one of the competing
interests, ignoring the countervailing factors. Employing a balancing
analysis to assess the future of administrative adjudication, this essay
will use as a model the Social Security Administration
6 
where over half of
the ALJs in this country are adjudicating social security disability
claims. The fact that the majority of ALJs are under the Social Security
Administration will better facilitate attempts to generalize about admini-
strative adjudications overall. Before any in-depth treatment of disability
adjudications is undertaken, a short explanation of the process that a
disability claim goes through is required.
The Social Security Disability Claim-
From Initiation to Judicial Review
The first step in seeking disability benefits is filling out an appli-
cation and a medical release form at the local Social Security District
Office with the assistance of district office personnel. After a deter-
mination that the claimant has met the quarter requirement,7 the district
office forwards the claim to the State Disability Determination Unit. The
medical records are obtained and a two-person team, which has no face to face
contact with the applicant, is assigned to the claim. From an examination
of the medical records the physician makes his determination and submits his
findings to an adjudicator who uses the physician's report as evidence of
the extent and nature of the impairment.
8 The adjudicator then determines
whether any of the impairments equals or meets the listings.9 If not, then
6. Administrative Law Process: Better Management Is Needed, Report Of The
Comptroller General To Congress 64 (May 1978), hereinafter cited Administrative
Law Process.
7. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.115 (1981).
8. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1526 (1981).
9. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1502(a) and Sec. 404.1505 (1981).
the adjudicator's findings on the claimant's age, education, and work
experience, along with the physician's assessment are plugged into the
appropriate table which yields a disability finding.
10 If the claimant
is not satisfied he appeals.
The first step in the appeals process is called reconsideration.
11
This appeal takes place in the State Disability Determination Unit- the
same office that made the initial determination. Claimants may (but are
not required to) submit additional medical evidence to demonstrate their
disability. A new two-person team is assigned and the initial determination
process is repeated.
The next step in the hierarchy is the Administrative Adjudication.
12
Although the hearings are informal and non-adversarial, the ALJ has the
affirmative duty to conscientiously probe into all the facts surrounding
the claim for disability benefits. The final level of administrative
review is the Appeals Council, a body possessing multi-faceted powers of
review. This super-bureau is authorized to exercise traditional dis-
cretionary review over ALJ decisions,
13 
self-initiated revisory power,1
4
and de novo review. 15
The last level of appeal for a dissatisfied claimant is the Federal
Court system. Upon receipt of the Appeals Council's decision, claimant has
sixty days to file a complaint in Federal District Court. The Social
Security Act requires that the courts apply the substantial evidence
rule. 16
This brief overview of the various levels of appeals available to
dissatisfied claimants reveals that disability claimants are afforded a
great deal of procedural due process before being denied disability benefits.
Admittedly, the conclusions that this adjudicatory process is a self-
correcting mechanism for the accurate finding of facts and the authoritative
application of law to fact because the hearing contains adequate procedural
safeguards, and because there are appellate checks on the initial decision,
10. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,368 (1978).
11. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.907 (1981).
12. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.929 (1981).
13. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.967 (1981).
14. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.979 (1981).
15. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.970(b) (1981).
16. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) (1974).
is not a unanimous one. 17 The elaborate appeals process, however, is only
one of the ways in which a claimant's right to a fair hearing is being
upheld. An examination of the selection process that ALJs go through
reveals that each claimant's case goes before a very qualified presiding
officer. Recognition of the expertise available to assist the ALJs also
reveals that each claimant's right to a fundamentally fair hearing is
being cautiously guarded. One final indicator of the impartiality of
disability claimants' hearings are the rates of success that claimants have
at the ALJ level. A closer look at each of these three areas discloses
that the claimant's right to due process of law is being scrupulously
guarded.
Qualification and Appointment of
the Administrative Law Judge
There is a two-tier selection process that ALJs must complete. The
first tier requires that the prospective ALJ be an attorney and have seven
or more years of qualifying experience. Qualifying experience includes
such things as judicial experience, the preparation, trial, hearing or
review of formal administrative law cases and the preparation and trial or
appeal of cases in courts of unlimited or original jurisdiction. Pro-
spective ALJs are first screened to determine whether they possess the
minimum qualifying experience. Their qualifying experience is assigned a
point value, with a maximum of sixty points.
The second tier of the qualification process requires that prospective
ALJs consent to having inquiries sent to approximately twenty individuals
having personal knowledge of their experience, professional abilities and
qualifications. The product of these twenty inquiries is assigned a point
value with a maximum of forty points. At this stage prospective ALJs who
have accumulated eighty points or more are rated as tentatively eligible and
are asked to prepare a sample opinion which is examined for clarity, conciseness,
and legal soundness. In addition to the sample opinion, the candidate goes
before a special interviewing panel who evaluates his sample opinion. Those
persons determined eligible for listing on either the GS-15 or GS-16 register
are ranked in order of their scores with the highest scores at the top of
the list. Agencies with a vacancy request a list of eligibles and make their
selection from the top three.
18
17. Mashaw, The Management Side qf Due Process, Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance, Fairness, and Timeliness in the
Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 772 (1979),
hereinafter cited as Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process.
18. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3318(a) (1977). But see 5 U.S.C. Secs. 2108, 3309
(1977). The impact of the rule of three is lessened by the provision
for selective certification: See generally Administrative Law Process,
supra, note 6.
This summary of the selection process, which each ALJ completes,
refutes some of the misconceptions related to the quality of the hearing
process. It is difficult to think of any method of selection of the pre-
siding officer that could be more rigorous. In fact, it is estimated
that approximately seventy-two percent of all applicants for ALJ positions
are rated ineligible. 19 Therefore, the disability claims that are
appealed to ALJs come before and are decided by extremely qualified individ-
uals who have been well scrutinized. That is not to say that every ALJ
is beyond reproach because no selection process is capable of preventing
an occasional abberation from slipping in.2 0 However, the current selection
process produces a large number of highly qualified ALJs.
In addition to their abundant legal expertise, ALJs deciding dis-
ability claims have access to a number of specialists who can supplement
their knowledge in other areas. For example, ALJs can utilize the expertise
of rehabilitation advisors, medical advisors and vocational experts. 2 1
These experts are not only practitioners but also teachers and have access
to the most current developments in their fields. Additionally, ALJs
have the authority to ask claimants to submit to consultative examinations
at the expense of the administration.
22
Another item indicative of the fact that disability claimant's right
to due process of law is being scrupulously guarded is illuminated by a
closer examination of the government reversal rate. As was previously
mentioned, claimants dissatisfied with the decision they receive from the
State Disability Determination Unit can appeal to an ALJ. ALJs reverse the
decision by the State Disability Determination Unit at a rate of approximately
sixty percent.23 Sixty percent is not a figure large enough to attribute
19. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible
Judiciary, 33 Adm. L. Rev. 109 (1981).
20. Interview with the Honorable Ronald J. Vitello, Administrative Law
Judge, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Indianapolis, Indiana, (August 6, 1981).
21. Id.
22. Id; 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1517 (1981).
23. Interview with the Honorable Ronald J. Vitello, supra, note 20. Note,
also that it will be argued later that the compilation of statistics on
the reversal rate and productivity of ALJs adversely affects their pro-
ductivity. That theory does not, however, conflict with the presentation
of statistics about the performance productivity and reversal rate of the
hierarchy below them.
ALJs with a bias for the claimant; it is, however, large enough to preclude
any bias against the claimant. The conscientious adherence to the concept
of fundamental fairness is indicated by the reversal rate of the Social
Security Administration-currently the ALJ's employer.
The flexibility provided by the informal atmosphere in administrative
adjudications is especially designed to meet the needs of disability
claimants. Complementing the informal atmosphere is the uniquely defined
role of the ALJ. Not only is the ALJ an independent, neutral party, but
he also has a mandate2 4 to take on an investigatory role when claimants
are not represented by counsel. The rigorous ALJ selection process in
conjunction with the ALJ's access to numerous medical, rehabilitative and
vocational experts, the ALJ reversal rate of State Disability Determination
Unit, the flexibility provided by the informal atmosphere of administrative
adjudications and the uniquely defined role of the ALJs, all work together
to create a forum particularly well-suited to the dispensing of due process of
law to disability claimants. This multi-faceted complexity of procedural
safeguards flies in the face of the argument that the clientele of social
welfare programs severely limit the value of procedural safeguards. The
comprehensiveness and versatility of the administrative adjudicatory system
provides the ALJ with a peculiar ability to adapt to the special needs of
disability claimants.
Efforts to improve the administrative adjudicatory processes are
constantly being put forth. Some of these efforts, however, have a detri-
mental impact. The excessive compilation of statistics concerning the ALJ
productivity and reversal rates, along with the pressure applied to ALJs
to produce more adjudications represents two of the solicitous but dis-
advantageous undertakings of the Social Security Administration. A survey
of the quality assurance program and a description of the types of pressure
put on ALJs discloses that the system would sincerely benefit from the
elimination of these aspects of the system.
Quality Assurance in
Disability Adjudications
The quality assurance program consists of three types of review. The
first type of review, conducted by the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
appraisal staff, is an analysis of a sample of cases on the basis of data
supplied by Appeals Council analy-sts. 25  Appraisal staff also evaluate ALJ
24. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404,944 (1981). Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
25. J. Mashaw, C. Goetz, F. Goodman, W. Schwartz, P. Verkull, M. Carrow,
Social Security Hearings and Appeals. (1978), hereinafter referred to as
J. Mashaw and C. Goetz .
performance through a series of special studies of such phenomena as
remand at various levels, the use of vocational experts and medical
advisors, and the correlation of error-with ALJ output or reversal rate.2
6
The second type of quality review is completed by the Regional Chiefs'
peer review program.27 This review focuses on the decisions of new
ALJs, all affirmations, and a twenty percent sample of reversals by low-
producing ALJs, cases involving allegations of unfair hearing and
reversal decisions and remands.28 The last type of review consists of
an Appeals Council peer review system in which each Appeals Council member
evaluates the cases appealed from the geographical area for which he is
responsible.
29
The above described quality assurance program was instituted as an
additional safeguard to assure accurate and timely adjudication of social
welfare claims. 30 The advocates of the quality assurance program admit
that "there is no hard evidence that the system has thus far enhanced due
process for disability claimants by increasing the accuracy of the hearing
process. '31 There is, however, evidence of the damage that has been done
by the institution of this quality assurance program. A recent survey of
ALJs3 2 described the measurement of productivity as being based on the
length of the trial and transcript, whereas others said it was determined on
the number of decisions yearly (with no reference to complexity of cases),
quarterly and monthly. In any event, weight is placed heavily on numbers.
The procedural protections gained by the uniquely designed administrative
adjudicatory system are severely infringed upon when the ALJ's productivity
is evaluated and forced to conform to hard cold numbers. Furthermore, the
quality assurance program decreases ALJ productivity. Most organizational
psychologists hold the view that productivity is influenced by worker moti-
vation 33 and the stifling of ALJ motivation is demonstrated by the fact that
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id; Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process, supra, note 12.
31. Chassman and Rolson, Social Security Disability Hearings: A Case
.Study In Quality Assurance and Due Process, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 801, 817
(1980).
32. Administrative Law Process, supra, note 6.
33. Id.
ALJs have complained bitterly about the statistical information compiled
concerning ALJ production and reversal rates.34 Some ALJs characterize
BHA's actions as attempts to undermine ALJ independence.35 It seems
paradoxical to create a versatile forum to adjudicate the complex and
subjective issues involved in disability claims, meticulously select a
highly qualified ALJ to determine these issues and then apply pressure to
ALJs to conform to arbitrary numerical standards without regard to
influential non-quantifiable factors.3 6
An example of a pragmatic consideration that is not accounted for in
statistical equations can be illustrated by comparing the social security
disability backlog of ALJs in Indianapolis, Indiana, to that of ALJs in
Detroit, Michigan. The backlog of ALJs in Indianapolis is negligible in
comparison to that of ALJs in Detroit. Detroit's extremely long backlog is
partially the result of the disastrous economic conditions of the automobile
industry which created more claimants seeking disability benefits as a means
of survival. Social Security ALJs in Detroit have their problems compounded
by the severe understaffing that they are experiencing due to the lengthy
government hiring freeze. The statistics concerning ALJ productivity do not
reflect the above-mentioned differences between Social Security ALJs in
Detroit and those in Indianapolis, Indiana.3 7
Another restriction on ALJs that works better in theory than in
practice is the time limits within which a case must be heard following
the filing of a request for a hearing. In White v. Mathews, 38 and Caswell
v. Califano, 39 the court imposed numerical time limits within which ALJs
must hear the claim. In theory, the time limit should operate to force
ALJs to adjudicate claims expeditiously. In practice, hasty determinations
are not necessarily fundamentally fair and accurate determinations. Similarly,
the intimation that ALJs who do not respond to agency pressure to produce
may find lack of cooperation in requests for reassignment or for new or
upgraded staff positions,40 violates the spirit of the independent structure
created by the Administrative Procedure Act.41
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Interview with the Honorable Ronald J. Vitello, supra, note 20.
37. Id.
38. 559 F.2d 852 (2nd Cir. 1977) cert. den., 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
39. 583 F.2d 9 (Ist Cir. 1978).
40. J. Mashaw and C. Goetz.
41. Ramsbeck v. Federal Trial Examiners, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
The quality assurance program and the general pressure on ALJs to
conform to time constraints, as defined by some circuit courts and the
agency, were originally intended to help insure that each disability.
claimant received a prompt determination and due process of law before
being denied disability benefits. Instead, however, these measures have
created judicial hostility. Additionally, statistics claiming to measure
the productivity of ALJs often do not take into account certain "real
world" considerations such as the city's economy and the federal govern-
ment's hiring freeze. Finally, rigidly defined numerical quotas and
time constraints within which the claim must be heard, work only in
theory and not in practice. The detrimental effects emanating from the
judicially-imposed time constraints, the agency-imposed numerical quotas
and the quality assurance program combined with the conspicuous absence
of evidence that these-methods are improving ALJ productivity indicates
that these measures should be abolished. Although some might argue that
it is too early to judge these operations and guidelines, the continuous
and consistently negative evidence should refute that contention.
Improving the System through
Judicial Education and Training
One possible way to address the concern for a claimant's right to a
fair but expeditious hearing is to provide more training for ALJs. Although
each ALJ goes through an initial six month training program before taking
office, 42 there is no structured follow-up program. Some ALJs have suggested
that more training would help them carry out their function more expeditiously.4 3
Training similar to that gained from attending conferences and seminars
sponsored by professional organizations, such as Federal Administrative Law
Judge Conference, American Bar Association, and the Federal Bar Association
needs to be offered on a regular basis.44  The agencies, however, are not
always willing to spend the money for ALJs to attend the conferences currently
offered by professional organizations. It would be beneficial to rechannel
some of the monies now being spent on the quality assurance program, which
has a negative effect on judicial productivity, and direct them to subsidize
some type of required semiannual conference or seminar for ALJs. These
training sessions should not only concentrate on new developments in the law
but also provide time for ALJs to get together to discuss various problem
solving techniques. It would also be helpful to include time for training in
areas outside the law. For example, ALJs in the Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals have often requested additional medical training:'45 Finally, some
additional training in trial and hearing procedures, techniques, evidence as
it should be applied in administrative litigation, writing style, decision
42. J. Mashaw and C. Goetz.
43. Administrative Law Process, supra, note 6.
44. Id; interview with the Honorable Ronald J. Vitello, supra, note 20.
45. Administrative Law Process, supra, note 6.
writing and executive and managerial techniques has been suggested.
46
Offering an opportunity for ALJs to catch up on the latest developments
in the law, discuss possible interpretations of the law and exchange
problem solving techniques is a less offensive and more effective means
of increasing judicial productivity than pointing fingers by highlighting
reversal rates and setting quotas.
Another problem with compiling reversal rates as an indicator of
accuracy is that this compilation does not take into consideration the
quirks of judicial review. Although the subject of judicial review, if
aptly treated, could easily require an entire essay, a discussion of the
future of administrative adjudication would not be complete without at
least touching upon judicial review. Before a discussion of judicial
review, a discussion of agency review is in order.
Improving the Process of Judicial
and Higher Agency Review
As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council has the authority to
render a decision de novo.4 7 This seems to be another provision that
works well in theory but not in practice. Assuming the theory is to give
disability claimants an opportunity to present new and material evidence,
the application of the theory has been overzealous. In practice, claimants
who can scrape up a scintilla of new, but not necessarily material evidence,
are given the opportunity for an additional level of review.4 8 This
practice is not what the legislature intended.
State and federal courts of appeal rarely exercise de novo review of
trial courts findings of fact because it is well-established that the
discretion of the trial court is broad. The trial judge's findings of
fact are given such a wide latitude because he has the opportunity to view
the original trial (especially the demeanor of the witnesses) and does
not base his determinations on the basis of merely the written record.
Applying this principle to Social Security Disability adjudication it seems
unwise to allow de novo review of the ALJ's determinations by the Appeals
Council. Since there is nothing to indicate that the Appeals Council
is more qualified than the ALJ, the de novo determination is repetitious
and a waste of time and resources. It seems reasonable to assume that
since ALJs also have the opportunity to view, firsthand, the original
adjudication, they too should be given a wide latitude of discretion.
Furthermore, since logic seems to dictate that the ALJ would be more qual-
ified to determine if the evidence was, in fact, new and material 4 9 this
46. Id.
47. Note 15, supra.
48. J. Mashaw and C. Goetz.
49. Id.
provision should be abolished.
50
Any treatment of judicial review of administrative adjudications
should start with an acknowledgment that there is a great deal of com-
plexity involved in exercising judicial review. ALJs do not claim to be
flawless and recognize the need for judicial review.51 On the other hand,
federal judges do not claim to be all-knowing and recognize the need for
a certain amount of deference to ALJ's determinations. 5 2 It appears on
the surface that these two relatively simple assertions could be readily
harmonized; however, any serious student of administrative law knows to
the contrary.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act and most statutes
generally, the standard of review is the substantial evidence standard.
53
The quarrei begins when one tries to define and apply the substantial evidence
standard; the case law is voluminous5 4 and the commentators disagree.55
This chaotic state of affairs may indicate that the legislature needs
to go back to the Administrative Procedure Act and set out a more polished,
intelligible, and guiding prescription of review. The existence of this
great confusion appears to mandate a more concretely defined standard.
That is not to say that the legislature should enlarge the reviewing
hand of the federal courts. Indeed, that over-burdened segment
50. Although not treated here, a great deal of investigation should be
given to the suggestion by some authors to abolish the appeals council.
See Schwartz, Commentary. Adjudication Process Under U.S. Social Security
Disability Law: Observations and Recommendations 32 Adm. L. Rev. 555 (1980).
51. Interview with the Honorable Ronald J. Vitello, supra, note 20.
52. See International Harvester Company v. Rickelhaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652
(1973).
53. Administrative Procedure Act Sec. 706.
54. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp 179 F.2d 749 (2nd Cir. 1950); Universal
Camera Corp v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp.
190 F.2d 429 (2nd Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Pittsburg Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498
(1951); NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2nd Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962); Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278 (4th
Cir. 1969); Brown v. Finch, 429 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v.
Gardner, 401 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Finch, 440 F.2d 613
(5th Cir. 1971); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB,
448 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
55. See R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass Justice at 99 (1973);
but see Schwartz, Commentary. Adjudication Process Under U.S. Social Security
Disability Law: Observations and Recommendations, 32 Adm. L. Rev. 555, 565
(1980).
of the judiciary deserves some relief.56 This time, the legislatures
should devote special attention to emphasizing the rationale underlying
the creation of administrative adjudications. What is needed is a
verbalization of the importance attached to the fact that ALJs and the
forums in which they function are exceptionally well-suited for the type
of adjudication they render. For example, ALJs making social security
disability determinations are especially trained in making disability
determinations. Additionally, they have access to medical advisors and
vocational experts who can provide them with useful insight into the facts
of each case. The National Labor Relations Board ALJs have special
expertise in labor-management relations; the Interstate Commerce ALJs have
special expertise in matters involving interstate commerce; the Civil
Aeronautics Board ALJs have superior knowledge in matters concerning
civil aeronautics, and the list goes on. The legislature should pay
attention to the issues raised by Judge Bazelon in International Harvester
Company v. Ruckelhaus5 7 when he wrote:
Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition
of how much one does not know. I may be wise if that
is wisdom, because I recognize that I do not know
enough about dynamometer, extrapolations, deterio-
ration, factor adjustments, and the like to decide
if the governments' approach to these matters was
statistically valid. Therein lies my disagreement
with the majority.5 8
Conclusion:
The Corps Concept of Adjudication
The most serious and meritorious of all the recommendations thus far
put forth is my concluding recommendation - the ALJ corps. The proposal to
create an independent corps of ALJs - separate from the agencies - seems
capable of correcting many of the shortcomings of the present structure
that are discussed in this essay. Agency pressure to produce, which com-
promises ALJ independence, would be eliminated by the corps proposal.
Implementation of the corps would not only enhance the independence of the
ALJ in fact, but also in appearance.59  Cynical skepticism concerning the
ALJs' impartiality will dissipate when he is not housed, serviced and paid
by the agency to which he is assigned.60 Since the circuit courts have
not set time limits on district court adjudications, it is possible that
circuit courts would cease to feel the need to impose numerical constraints
56. See note 2, supra.
57. 478 F.2d 615, 652 (1973) (Bazelon C.J. concurring).
58. Id.
59. Gladstone, Commentary The Adjudicative Process in Administrative
Law, 37 Adm. L. Rev. 237 (1979).
60. id.
within which ALJs must hear cases pending. Also, since the corps would
not be under the agency there would be no need to fanatically compile
statistics which stifle ALJ motivation and decrease ALJ productivity.
In addition to correcting some of the problems inherent in our
current structure, the corps will retain the advantages of being an
administrative forum. The corps would still employ meticulously selected
and highly qualified ALJs to adjudicate claims in a versatile forum
designed to accommodate the complex and subjective issues presented. ALJs
are currently lobbying for the creation of the corps 6l and a serious
investigation of how it can be implemented (not if it can be implemented).
The suggestions that this essay puts forth for short term changes in the
social security disability adjudications are only temporary solutions.
The ALJ corps is the long term corrective measure needed to help facilitate
less extensive judicial review of ALJ decisions, and more prompt and accurate
adjudication in accordance with notions of "fundamental fairness."
Comment: Readers are commended to an interesting related article by
F.S. Bloch, Representation and Advocacy at Non-Advocacy Hearings: The
Need for Non-Adversary Representatives at Social Security Disability
Hearings, 59 Wash. U.L.Q. 319 (1981).
61. Interview with the Honorable Ronald J. Vitello, supra, note 15.
